Post Right Wing looniness here

[Garmel]

A reasonable requirement? This is an example of you being wildly unfair to the US and holding them to a standard to which you'd never hold our enemies. Japan can bomb Pearl Harbor and do things in East Asia that would have made the worst Nazis uncomfortable, but you'll call us out for being unfair in the timing of our surrender demands, as if we owed them something. It was a war. We didn't owe them ****. We didn't have to warn them about the bomb. We didn't have to even give them a chance to surrender. Doing so was an act of mercy that they rejected.



The invasion (Operation Downfall) was already planned and ready to go. Nimitz and MacArthur were planning and ready to do it. It was the next logical step. The speculation that they were going to surrender is a classic "if my grandmother had balls, she'd be my grandfather" scenario. Maybe they would have, maybe they wouldn't have. But the point is that when given multiples chances, they didn't. They chose total destruction over unconditional surrender.

Operation Downfall had a dead and missing estimate of 267,000 for our side that extended all of the way to 1947.

1947, folks.

 

[Horn6721]

I am just amazed that Anyone could think Japan would have surrendered with no further attacks from Allies.

Garm Thanks for that
I guess for those who were against the bombs it was OK for hundreds of thousands more to die
NONE of them were going in Harms way

 

[Monahorns]

“In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. … The Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’ The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude.”

— Dwight D. Eisenhower

 

[Monahorns]

“[T]he Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945… up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped. … f such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the bombs.”

— Herbert Hoover

 

[Monahorns]

“I told [General Douglas] MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria.”

— Herbert Hoover

 

[Monahorns]

“MacArthur’s views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed. When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.”

— Norman Cousins

 

[Monahorns]

“The Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and the Swiss. And that suggestion of giving a warning of the atomic bomb was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted. In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb.”

— Ralph Bird, Under Secretary of the Navy

 

[Monahorns]

“I concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945. Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands scheduled for 1 November 1945 would have been necessary.”

— Paul Nitze, director, later Vice Chairman of the
Strategic Bombing Survey

 

[Monahorns]

“[E]ven without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion. Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”

— U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946

 

[Monahorns]

“The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan.”

— Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

 

[Monahorns]

“[Gen.] Arnold’s view was that the dropping of the atomic bomb was totally unnecessary. He said he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision, and Arnold did not feel it was the military’s job to question them. … [Arnold’s view was]: when the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander-in-Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion.”

— General Ira Eaker, Deputy Commander of
U.S. Army Air Forces

 

[Monahorns]

“The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. … The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all. The war would’ve ended anyway.”

— Major General Curtis LeMay
XXI Bomber Command

 

[Monahorns]

“Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia. Washington decided it was time to use the A-bomb. I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds.”

— Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the
Office of Naval Intelligence

“The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. … It was a mistake to ever drop it. … [The scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it.”

— Fleet Admiral William Halsey Jr.

“When we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs. Many other high-level military officers concurred.”

— Brigadier General Carter Clarke, Military Intelligence
officer in charge of preparing summaries of intercepted
Japanese cables for President Truman and his advisers

 

[Monahorns]

“In the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the retention of the dynasty had been issued in May 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the Japanese government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clear-cut decision. If surrender could have been brought about in May 1945, or even in June, or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the Pacific war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer.”

— Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew

 

[Monahorns]

Well, one is that we can't let them keep an authoritarian government.

Then why did Japan get to retain the emperor after the fact? That shows the statement invalid.

 

[Garmel]

Then why did Japan get to retain the emperor after the fact? That shows the statement invalid.

The emperor was stripped of all authority and became a figurehead. Japan has been a democracy since shortly after WWII.

 

[Monahorns]

The emperor was stripped of all authority and became a figurehead. Japan has been a democracy since shortly after WWII.

Yes. That is all they were asking for. The US said they were going to allow even that during negotiations, then gave them the condition they were asking for after the fact.

 

[guy4321]

Imagine if nuclear weapons were used in the Korean war.

 

[Horn6721]

So some of the anti bomb people thought naval blockade and conventional bombing might have ended the war by end of dec 1945. I wonder how many airmen's death is acceptable to them? Not to mention how many Japanese would have died. Doubt the Allies were only going to "conventionally bomb only 2 cities None of those "experts" as far as I know EVER spoke of how many deaths they thought were acceptable by continuing the war.

I think Winston said it best
"There are voices which assert that the bomb should never have been used at all. I cannot associate myself with such ideas. ... I am surprised that very worthy people—but people who in most cases had no intention of proceeding to the Japanese front themselves—should adopt the position that rather than throw this bomb, we should have sacrificed a million American and a quarter of a million British lives."

 

[Mr. Deez]

Yes. That is all they were asking for. The US said they were going to allow even that during negotiations, then gave them the condition they were asking for after the fact.

They asked for that on August 10, 1945 - the day after the nuclear strike on Nagasaki.

 

[Mr. Deez]

So some of the anti bomb people thought naval blockade and conventional bombing might have ended the war by end of dec 1945. I wonder how many airmen's death is acceptable to them? Not to mention how many Japanese would have died. Doubt the Allies were only going to "conventionally bomb only 2 cities None of those "experts" as far as I know EVER spoke of how many deaths they thought were acceptable by continuing the war.

I think Winston said it best
"There are voices which assert that the bomb should never have been used at all. I cannot associate myself with such ideas. ... I am surprised that very worthy people—but people who in most cases had no intention of proceeding to the Japanese front themselves—should adopt the position that rather than throw this bomb, we should have sacrificed a million American and a quarter of a million British lives."

I don't buy it. We had already done significant strategic bombing of Japan, and they didn't surrender. Hell, we friggin' barbecued Germany's cities, and even they (who were far less committed than the Japanese) had to be invaded before they'd give up.

 

[Horn6721]

Mr D
You are in good company. One thing None of the anti bomb people address is the people who would have died IF the war had gone beyond Aug. 1945

 

[Monahorns]

They asked for that on August 10, 1945 - the day after the nuclear strike on Nagasaki.

Not how I understand it.

 

[Monahorns]

Mr D
You are in good company. One thing None of the anti bomb people address is the people who would have died IF the war had gone beyond Aug. 1945

You guys continue to ignore the voices of prominent military leaders at the time. None of that was needed. None would have died.

 

[Monahorns]

I don't buy it. We had already done significant strategic bombing of Japan, and they didn't surrender. Hell, we friggin' barbecued Germany's cities, and even they (who were far less committed than the Japanese) had to be invaded before they'd give up.

That's fine. You don't buy the opinions of the 2 generals and 1 admiral who were running things. Instead you believe the narrative built years later by Truman supporters and other Democrats to protect Truman's legacy.

 

[Mr. Deez]

You guys continue to ignore the voices of prominent military leaders at the time. None of that was needed. None would have died.

That's fine. You don't buy the opinions of the 2 generals and 1 admiral who were running things. Instead you believe the narrative built years later by Truman supporters and other Democrats to protect Truman's legacy.

That's because the facts ultimately proved them wrong. They weren't perfect.

 

[Garmel]

You guys continue to ignore the voices of prominent military leaders at the time. None of that was needed. None would have died.

That was their opinion, nothing more. As Deez said they were wrong.

If they were so sure we wouldn't have planned Operation Downfall.

 

[Horn6721]

Mona?
How can you in seriousness say NONE would have died. Please explain How you can say none would have died if the war had been extended?

 

[Mr. Deez]

Not how I understand it.

Well, I think you're mistaken. Link.

Another Imperial Council was held the night of August 9-10, and this time the vote on surrender was a tie, 3-to-3. For the first time in a generation, the emperor (right) stepped forward from his normally ceremonial-only role and personally broke the tie, ordering Japan to surrender. On August 10, 1945, Japan offered to surrender to the Allies, the only condition being that the emperor be allowed to remain the nominal head of state.

Until August 10, nobody even had authority to offer the surrender terms you're suggesting.

Also, from prior to the attacks. . .

From the replies these diplomats received from Tokyo, the United States learned that anything Japan might agree to would not be a surrender so much as a "negotiated peace" involving numerous conditions. These conditions probably would require, at a minimum, that the Japanese home islands remain unoccupied by foreign forces and even allow Japan to retain some of its wartime conquests in East Asia. Many within the Japanese government were extremely reluctant to discuss any concessions, which would mean that a "negotiated peace" to them would only amount to little more than a truce where the Allies agreed to stop attacking Japan. After twelve years of Japanese military aggression against China and over three and one-half years of war with the United States (begun with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor), American leaders were reluctant to acceept anything less than a complete Japanese surrender.

Even what the Japanese floated to the US suggested more of an armistice than a surrender - they'd keep their government, no occupation, and they keep some of their wartime conquests. Not even in the right galaxy of a serious offer to end a war we were clearly winning, and the Japanese were reluctant to even pitch this.

 

[Monahorns]

That's because the facts ultimately proved them wrong. They weren't perfect.

The facts didn't prove them wrong. That is faulty reasoning.

The facts showed there was a more powerful faction making decisions. It wasn't the military, so who could it have been?